Rational and forward-looking individuals know that government debts today mean higher taxes in the future. The Ricardian equivalence at the national level implies that the burden of the debt cannot be shifted between generations as intergenerational transfers allow the future generation to pay back the debts. We argue that at the local level a similar equivalence holds even for non-altruistic individuals but works through a di¤erent channel: Landed property persists over time and …scal di¤erences are capitalized in property values. Our theoretical model predicts that communities with a more favorable asset/debt structure have, ceteris paribus, higher property prices. We con…rm these predictions empirically using a panel dataset for communities in the Swiss metropolitan area of Zurich.
Introduction
The Ricardian approach to public budget de…cits and public debts starts from the observation that a de…cit-…nanced cut in current taxes leads to higher future taxes that have the same present value as the initial tax reduction. The main argument is that for su¢ ciently forward-looking individuals discounted future taxes are equivalent to current taxes. Consequently, for a given present value of public expenditures, debt or future tax …nancing are equivalent too and burden of the debt is not shifted between generations. Barro (1974) uses an overlapping generations model in which the utility of future generations enters as an additional variable into the utility function of the current generation in order to achieve this equivalence.
In this paper we model and empirically test another mechanism of the correspondence between future taxes and public debts for local public …nance: capitalization of jurisdictional assets and debts. The Ricardian equivalence as stated by Barro has mostly been discussed in the context of national debts. In an urban area the price of housing re ‡ects individual preferences for tax/public service packages. Capitalization is said to occur when, for given housing and demographic characteristics, the di¤erence in local property values equals di¤erences in taxes and public services. Higher municipal debts lead to higher taxes in the future, thereby reducing property values today. Instead of using a setting with intergenerational transfers between (altruistic) individuals, we show in a theoretic model that unaltruistic utility maximization leads to the equivalence of taxes and debts through the channel of capitalization. Intuitively, the mechanism can be described as follows: Landed property exists over time. Fiscally aware consumers have expectations concerning the future appreciation or depreciation of real estate values in a community. If the current generation expects house prices to rise in the future due to good communal management of local public assets and low debts, people bid more for houses today causing them to rise immediately. On the other hand, communities with negative prospects due to high de…cits, large debts and low communal fortune should see house prices decline even today. Current property owners pro…t from high municipal net funds and bear the burden of local public debts and bad local asset management.
Note that the current inhabitants cannot simply make debts and move away from the community. Property markets guarantee that the capitalization mechanism works and the future buyers'bids for the sellers'houses will be lower by exactly the amount of taxes they have to pay in the future when the buyers move to the community. Consequently, current residents must either pay for municipal public goods and services through current taxes or the equivalent lower market value of their real estate when debts are used instead of taxes. Our theoretical model clearly predicts this pattern. Communities with higher net funds which are equal to lower debts and/or large assets should theoretically have higher house values as taxes are not expected to rise in the future.
In fact, the idea of some equivalence of tax and debt …nancing in the local public setting was discussed even before Barro's seminal paper. Daly (1969) argues that the present value of a local government project is independent of the …nancing scheme as the discounted value of public debts in ‡uence house prices. He states that "the individual who owns the property at the time that tax is imposed bears the burden". 1 In the local context the capitalization mechanism, as the local version of the equivalence of taxes and …scal de…cits, might be more appealing than the national one which works through interdependent utility functions. Barro's formulation presumes individual (altruistic) behavior which e¤ectively leads to an in…nite time horizon whereby the form of …nance of a public expenditure program becomes irrelevant. His basic idea is that intergenerational transfers between individuals make each of them part of a kin that goes on inde…nitely. The current generations o¤set possible negative e¤ects of public debts by increasing their savings which leads to higher bequests for the coming generations. The increase in savings is equal to the future increase in taxes needed to pay back the debts. Hence, tax or debt …nance of public expenditures are independent of intertemporal consumption.
We argue that adjustments of housing markets are similar to price adjustments in the (almost) perfect …nancial markets. Using capitalization, the assumption of altruism to obtain in…nite time horizons can be dropped as well as adjustment mechanisms through credit markets and savings. Indeed, empirical results suggest that national savings do not react (signi…cantly) to changes in public de…cits.
2 Barro (1989) mentions a number of empirical studies where the results in favor and against the Ricardian equivalence are all over the map. He mainly attributes this fact to the well-known identi…cation problem in empirical analyses and the simultaneity between consumption and income. Endogeneity problems are usually less pronounced when the dependent variables are housing prices and most recent articles only marginally discuss the problem (see for example Stull and Stull 1991 , Palmon and Smith 1998 , Brasington 2001 or Brasington 2002 . 3 Consequently, we bring our theoretical model to the data. For our study we analyze the price of comparable single family houses in the Swiss metropolitan area of Zurich using a panel model for the years 1998 to 2004. Swiss municipalities form a particularly good …scal laboratory for our purposes as they have a high autonomy level concerning local income taxes and …nancing decisions. Moreover, communities in Zurich have a common harmonized public accounting system for budgeting, bookkeeping, and reporting which further facilitates comparisons of …scal variables. Finally, the Swiss federal court prohibits higher government levels from bailing out municipalities. Municipal real net funds which are …nancial assets minus liabilities are a commonly used indicator in government publications. 4 We show that municipal net funds capitalize positively, holding everything else constant, making a strong case for the equivalence of taxes and public debts as …nancing instruments in the local public sector. Bootstrapping the regressions for a number of di¤erent measures for communal wealth leads to the same results. 5 2 Feldstein (1996) con…rms results from prior studies indicating that "each dollar of Social Security wealth reduces private saving by between two and three cents." An increase in the scope of national social security programs which is a major factor in public accounts and consequently a contributor to public debts, raises national aggregate demand and reduces investment. 3 In the …rst capitalization study Oates (1969) still treats the problem of possible endogeneity of property taxes and housing prices. The results di¤er little when comparing OLS and IV estimates. 4 The Statistical O¢ ce of the Canton of Zürich writes in its press release statistik.info 21/2003 that "the most important …nancial indicator of the balance sheet are the net funds"(translated from German). 5 We calculate partial capitalization rates for our independent variable municipal real net funds and full capitalization cannot be rejected. The literature has not reached a consensus on capitalization rates yet. In a comprehensive study Yinger, Bloom, Börsch-Supan, and Ladd (1988) report modest capitalization rates between 15 and 30 % for property taxes. In a recent study Palmon and Smith (1998) report rates of over 60 %.
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Our theoretical model and empirical results have appealing consequences. Firstly, the bene…ts of public goods and services are independent of the …nancing scheme used.
Whether a local government project capitalizes positively depends on the nature and the advantages of the project itself and not on the way it was …nanced. Secondly, although people might be concerned with the attainable indi¤erence surface of their descendants, this is not a necessary assumption in order to obtain the stated equivalence in the local public sector with mobile individuals. The proposed capitalization e¤ect is su¢ cient.
Finally, if housing markets function without interference and inhabitants do not su¤er from …scal illusion, the current generation cannot shift the burden of local debts to the future. Even if people do not care about the future generation they cannot deplete a community's reserves without facing the consequences since the future burden negatively a¤ects today's property values. Their assets, in the form of house values, fall by the same amount as they tried to impose a burden on future inhabitants.
We are aware that in real life di¤erent situations may be present that hamper the capitalization mechanism. Such problems include market ine¢ ciencies as a consequence of moving costs, di¤erences in interest rates between municipalities and households when borrowing, slow adjustment mechanisms, and the possibility of …scal illusion as proposed by Buchanan (1964) . Still, even if these problems exist, they cannot utterly annihilate the mechanism: capitalization of low municipal net funds might not be complete but partial.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents Barro's equivalence and brie ‡y comments on the proposed mechanism for national debts. Moreover, we discuss the related literature on capitalization of taxes and public goods as well as studies that analyzed the problem of underfunding of local pension funds. In Section 3 we build a theoretical model which proposes capitalization as a channel, leading to the equivalence of taxes and debts. Our analysis shows the in ‡uence of local public net funds on an individual's bid for properties. The model is brought to the data in Section 4. We perform a number of robustness tests and discuss possible upward biases of our coe¢ cient estimates for the capitalization of a community's net funds. Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes.
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Related Literature
The traditional view of government debts presumes that when governments cuts taxes and run de…cits consumers increase their spending as disposable incomes increase. Barro (1974) considers an alternative view of government budget de…cits. For a given path of government spending, today's de…cits are equivalent to future taxes. Hence, a cut in today's taxes must be matched by an increase in the present value of future taxes. In an overlapping generations model where households act as though they lived in…nitely, there will be no e¤ect of government debts as (altruistic) individuals increase their savings in order to allow the future generation to pay back the debts. A tax cut …nanced by government budget de…cits does not reduce the tax burden for the current generation, it simple reschedules it. It is important to note that Barro's results are generated by the in…nite time horizon of his individuals. A member of a particular generation is assumed to be concerned with his own consumption and with the attainable indi¤erence surface of his descendant who is concerned with his own consumption and the attainable indi¤erence surface of his descendant, ad in…nitum. This form of utility function implies generationally interdependent preferences and e¤ectively creates in in…nite time horizon although each individual member of a generation has only …nite life.
Clearly, in order to establish the equivalence between taxes and public debts loan markets must be perfect, individuals must be certain about their future income and government tax-collection costs must not be too distortive. The correspondence between taxes and budget de…cits might be weakened by market imperfections but should persist partially for government debts.
The above stated view was labeled by Buchanan (1976) and others as well as Barro (1989) himself as the "Ricardian equivalence". Indeed, Ricardo remarks that the issuance of debts brings about a temporal redistribution of payments. The incidence, though, does not change. Ricardo writes: "When, for the expenses of a year's of war, twenty millions are raised by means of loan, it is the twenty millions which are withdrawn from the productive capital of the nation. Persistent budget de…cits and increasing debts have aroused interest in the Ricardian equivalence in the past. Barro (1989) discusses major empirical and theoretical objections that have been brought forward against his conclusions. The empirical results are inconclusive which can be attributed to the general identi…cation problems and endogeneity issues. The main theoretical objection concerning the mechanism is related with the intergenerational transfers and the interdependent utility functions. It is this hypothesis that actually generates the necessary in…nite time horizons and therefore the equivalence. In a more recent paper Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) analyzed survey results following an executive order by Persident George Bush senior in 1992 that lowered the amount of income taxes that were being withheld from workers'paychecks. The order did not have any e¤ect on the total amount of taxes that workers had to pay, it simply delayed payment. According to the Ricardian equivalence consumption should not increase as people should save, in this case even unaltruistically for themselves, to pay the taxes in the following year. 7 Shapiro and Slemrod's results question this conjecture.
43 % of the survey respondents announced that they would spend the (extra) income.
The rest said that they would use it to repay debts, save it or adjust their withholding in order to reverse Bush's order. Although people understood that the following year's tax bill would be higher many planned to spend the extra take-home pay.
In the context of local public …nance a similar correspondence between taxes and public debts exists as the one stated by Barro for the national level. First formulated by Daly (1969) , the equivalence works through the housing and land market. The author argues that by issuing bonds and accumulating debts a community is only able to alter the time distribution of explicit tax payments. Sometime the outstanding debt has to be paid back. If the issuing generation wants to sell its property it faces lower values when large obligations were accumulated in the past. The buying generation bids less for the assets as they have to pay back the accumulated debts through higher taxes in 6 See On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxations, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo on pages 244-245. 7 Including the fact that credit markets are imperfect consumption could increase by a little as may be those who were liquidity-constrained in 1992 would spend the money right away. 7 the future. Debts therefore reduce the price for the current generations'houses and they have to bear the burden.
In the same year Oates (1969) argues in a path-breaking study that consumers migrate to the jurisdiction o¤ering the tax/public services packages which is the best suitable to their preferences. Di¤erences in these …scal packages are then re ‡ected in the price of housing services that individuals are willing to pay to live at a certain location, providing a test for the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis. Oates'regressions con…rm capitalization of both property taxes and public goods which are approximated by expenditures.
Following Oates a number of well known papers in public …nance defend a completely opposite vision, regarding the question of an empirical test for the Tiebout model. Starting with a critical comment from Pollakowski (1973) and an immediate reply in Oates (1973) , authors like Edel and Sclar (1974) and Hamilton (1976 AER, 1976 argue against the capitalization of …scal variables such as taxes, expenditures or public services into housing prices because they see them as demand side e¤ects only. Brueckner (1979) provides a excellent insight into this scienti…c discussion. Starrett (1981) and Yinger (1982) …nally conclude the intellectual debate after more than a decade by providing theoretical models that validate the capitalization of …scal di¤erences in the long run.
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A large volume of empirical literature followed the …rst capitalization studies mainly di¤ering in the degrees of capitalization for diverse variables and the hypotheses tested.
The literature …nds that apart from di¤erentials in taxes and public services, school quality, environmental standards, neighborhood characteristics etc. are partly or fully capitalized into property values. A comprehensive study for capitalization was done by Yinger, Bloom, Börsch-Supan, and Ladd (1988) . Other and more recent capitalization analyses include Stull and Stull (1991) , Palmon and Smith (1998) , Epple and Sieg (1999) and Brasington (2002) among others. Property values have also been used as a proxy for the valuation of public goods. Black (1999) , Figlio and Lucas (2004) or Reback (2005) are some of the numerous examples. Fischel (2001) argues that property owners are watchful citizens of local governments in order to counteract possible risks to their assets.
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Even though a rather large number of empirical studies consider a wide range of di¤erent variables, only a handful includes local assets and public debts. The available analyses mainly address unfunded liabilities of pension systems by municipal governments.
10 Epple and Schipper (1981) 9 As the number of potential capitalization facturs is high Stadelmann (2007) considers a large set of variables in an empirical "Horse Race" using Bayesian Model Averaging. 10 In a comprehinseve literature research we found two contributions only. Generally, it is di¢ cult to …nd studies on capitalization of certain variables as authors do not usually consider them as capitalization analysis but as mainly relevant in their speci…c …eld.
3 A Model for the Capitalization of Municipal Assets and Liabilities
Individuals
Our main unit of analysis are mobile individuals that bid for housing services in di¤erent communities. An individual exists for n+1 periods. When choosing a residential location, a persons's bid for a home is in ‡uenced by the community's tax schedule, its public services and several di¤erent amenities in the community. His willingness to pay for a speci…c location is given by a bid function for housing services in the metropolitan area which takes the following form
Here is a known vector of income tax rates 0 ; 1 ; :::; n faced by the individual in a community. g t represents some measure of the level of public services in period t and r is a discount rate supposed to be equal to the market discount rate. 11 The vector a = [a 0 ; a 1 ; ::a m ] T stands for a number of amenities such as low air pollution, view on a lake, proximity to the center, good exposition, as well as other housing characteristics. For a moving consumer the level of public services, the tax rate and the vector of amenities are treated as given. The formulation and later derivation of the bid function is similar to Ellickson (1971) , Brueckner (1979) and Yinger (1981 AER, 1982 .
The main di¤erence to these authors is, that we explicitly consider a time structure in our model by including the present values of public services together with an income tax schedule. Furthermore, our model does not only include …scal variables but also locational amenities in the bid function.
A consumer can spend its income on a composite consumption good, c t , with unit price in every period. Housing services, H; are consumed at the beginning of an individuals's existance and persist in…netly afterwards. The value of a house can be described 11 Tax rates and public services for periods 1; :::; n can be interpreted as expected values.
by H . Each person pays an income tax, given in each period t of
If we ignore mobility costs, each consumer can, even though he does not explicitely choose taxes and public services, vary his tax/public service package by choosing the community to live in. A person therefore tries to maximize
where C is the discounted sum of consumption of c t . 12 The necessary side condition is given by
The local government budget constraint does not enter the individuals's side condition directely but indirectly through its in ‡uence on house values, . 13 Note that local income taxes as an element of a consumer's choice for residential location are therefore not directly linked to public services. Although individuals might know that taxes are used to …nance public services, they are not exactly acquainted how e¢ ciently the transformation from taxes to services operates. Some communities might be more e¢ cent than others in providing public goods for given taxes. Following the same logic, spillovers from neighboring communities only in ‡uence a consumers's bid by increasing the availability of public goods. When an individual buys a home he is obligated to obay local laws and pay local income taxes for which he receives local public services in return. Other things equal, communities with low taxes or high quality of service (or both) have higher property values than communities without these virtues because consumers only give high bids for favorable tax/public service combinations. The community's net fortune is re ‡ected by the tax schedule in the bid price function since communal budget de…cits and local debts have to be repaid at sometime in the future by taxes. 12 We use throughout the following notation C = P n t=0 ct (1+r) t and Y = P n t=0 yt (1+r) t .
Local Financing Decisions
The local government …nances expenditures internally by taxation or by running de…cits.
Public de…cits can be …nanced by increasing external debts, hence reducing the net fortune of the community. Local borrowing is mainly external in the sense that it is not held by citizens of the community. 14 This is usually the case for municipal debts. For small communities such debts are often granted by banks. In the case of Switzerland banks like UBS or Credit Suisse as well as the special cantonal banks have separate divisions for jurisdictions and public sector entities.
The local government's actions are assumed to take place in perfect markets and under certainty.
Without restriction of generality we analyze a local government project performed in period s only. Such a project can be …nanced by the imposition of an extrordinatry income tax s which will cover the entire costs. The other alternative is to …nance the project by reducing the community's net funds by debts or budget de…cits in period s and the following ones. Over time, depleted reserves have to be replenished and debts have to be repaid. We suppose that this is done in yearly installments D s+t …nanced by income taxation. Individual income tax revenue is used in the following way
where T s+t represent tax funds per capita available for public service production, so that g s+t becomes a function of the sum T s+t for all individuals. As mentionned, for the bid function it is not necessary to know the exact form the the production function for public goods g s+t ( P T s+t ) because households consider taxes and public services separately in their bids.
Supply of Housing in the Long-Run
The bid function (1) for housing services gives the demand side of the market for housing.
For each jurisdiction the supply of possible residential areas,L, is …xed. Consequently, nonresidential land cannot be converted endlessly and the supply of housing must become inelastic when approachingL. For constructing H a certain amount of land is needed, L = cH. Suppliers cannot in ‡uence …scal variables and take bids as given. They develop
The rising costs of land conversion imply that the reaction of land developers on …scal di¤erences by supplying additional housing ceases once all pro…table conversion has occured. Moreover, land developpers do not only react on di¤erences in …scal variables but also on di¤erences in amenities which are an additional source of heterogeneity and variation. In long-run equilibrium, for a su¢ ciently high c and an alreadly large number of H like in a metropolitan area, no more conversions are possible and local …scal variables will be capitalized. Then house prices react to changes in tax/public service combinations and amenities as described in (1). Edel and Sclar (1974) and Hamilton (1976 AER, 1976 argue against the capitlaization of …scal variables such as taxes, expenditures or public services into housing prices because they see them as demand side e¤ect only. They have claimed that in a fully adjusted Tiebout equilibrium local taxes are pure bene…t taxes, that is, they are considered by households as a price for public goods and there should be no relation to the housing's market price. According to these authors the supply of jurisdictions can be increased in the very long run. Therefore, the supply of any arbitrary tax/public service combination is perfectly elastic. In this case competition equalizes di¤erentials in house values.
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Anyhow, housing prices are also in ‡uenced by additional factors such as the vector of other amenities a included in (1). They decline, for example, with higher air pollution, greater distance to the center or worse exposition. If developers have to build houses in 15 Details for all necessary steps are given in the annex. 16 Epple, Zelenitz, and Visscher (1978) and Epple and Zelenitz (1981) mention that a test of capitalization and a test of the Tiebout hypotheesis are not the same. A test for capitalization is feasible when residents are informed about …scal characteristics in alternative jurisdictions and government restrictions do not cause individuals to consume more housing than they would in the absence of such restrictions. 13 more industrial areas, further away from the center, or at windward sides of mountains their pro…ts decline even though taxes migh be low and public services are provided e¢ ciently. Besides, tax revenue does not necessarily translate in the same direct way into public services for all communities as supposed by the above mentionned authors.
The supply of tax/public service combinations cannot be perfectly elastic.
Adding new communities with most desirable cost/performance ratios is not feasible as land developers have no incentive to add them if equation (5) holds. Yinger (1981 AER, 1982 brings forward similar arguments against the case of Edel and Sclar (1974) and Hamilton (1976 AER, 1976 by discussing speci…cally the in ‡uence of higher commuting costs for households at the urban edge. He concludes that only if jurisdiction boundaries were ‡exible and …scal zoning was used, juristictions with desirable tax/public service packages could devour others and di¤erentials would vanish.
This seems a rather unrealistic case as a juristiction's size does not usually change because of rent di¤erentials and such changes depend on strong political will.
As a consequence of (5) for large c and H in an urban setting and the above discussion, we do not need to consider the supply side any more in the long-run. Housing values are only in ‡uenced by bids for tax/service combinations and amenities.
Debt Financing and House Values
Consumers'bids for housing can be derived from the …rst-order conditions of the maximization problem. We only need to consider the partial derivates of (3) for t and the partial derivates of the Lagrangian of (2) for g t and a i which are
for all t = 0; 1; :::; n and all amenities i. Competitive bidding for housing services insures that represents the equilibrium price in the metropolitan area. The bids must satisfy 14 (6), (7) and (8) when the market cleares which allows us to derive the bid function.
Higher taxes t induce, ceteris paribus, a lower bid price. The e¤ect of a such an increase for given g t and given a can be found by solving the di¤erential equation (6) for every period and converting the ‡ow of tax payments into a stock at t = 0 by discounting.
The result is
where ( G) + ( a) is a constant of integration as public services and amenities are held constant. The equation (9) describes the reaction of the bids for a house to changes in the income tax schedule . Clearly, higher taxes have a negative in ‡uence on the bid price. The size of the e¤ect equals exactely the future discounted taxes to pay.
This result is independent of the household utility function used. Importantly, if public services and amenities change the constant of integration in equation (9) change too.
The in ‡uence of taxes on bids represents therefore only a partial e¤ect. According to Ellickson (1971) and Yinger (1982) local …scal variables which are capitalized in house prices across communities re ‡ect an individual's willingness to pay for tax-expenditure combinations. This is clearly the case here for income taxes.
In order to …nd the full from of of we must determine ( G) and ( a). This can be achieved by solving di¤erential equations (7) and (8). Withouth specifying a functional form of the utility function (2), we suppose that public services and amenities enter (9) in a linear way. 18 For our purpose the exact e¤ects of g t and a i on house values is of little importance as we focus on di¤erent …nancing schemes of given public services and amenities. Nevertheless, this process allows us to come up with an equation that can be 17 Details for all necessary steps are given in the appendix. 18 Instead of using a direct linear formulation we could specify a utility function because for the general case the results cannot be derived analytically. A standard Cobb-Douglas utility function U = 1 ln(X) + 2 ln(H) + 3 ln(G) + T ln( a) proves to be convenient. The results, using (7) and (8) are (see appendix for details)
where and i for i = 0; 1; :::; m are constants of integration. We remark that the result is not far from a linear formulation if the exponents are summarized in the constants and i . 15 brought to the data directly.
Combining the bids for government services and amenities with (9) and interpreting H as one house gives the complete bid function,
The full bid equation describes how tax rates, local public services and local amenities are capitalized into the price of housing. In this form the estimation can easily be implemented empirically. The bid price function is su¢ cient to show the capitalization e¤ects of local …scal variables because the price of a house enters the buyer's budget constraints.
As taxes are correctly anticipated, we can enter the choice possiblity for local …nancing decisions (4) for the …rst term in (12). Taking the partial di¤erential for D s+t shows a negative capitalization e¤ect of low reserves and high repayment obligations, D s+t < 0 for all t. Low municipal net fortunes, or equivalently high debts and de…cits, mean higher future taxes and lead to lower bids. Clearly, the undergone public project might increase house values. Though, it is important to note that whatever bene…ts might be gained because of the project's realization, it is always true that such bene…ts are due to the project itself. The …nancing decisions (such as an increase in taxes, a reduction in reserves, an increase in debts etc.) are in the bid function independent of the of the former, current and future bene…ts of the project. Hence, the degree to which house values are increased depends upon the nature of the project itself, not the way it was …naced as potential project bene…ts enter (12) through the second term and not the …rst. The issuance of debts does not change their incidence, as already noted by Ricardo.
This establishes the propsed equivalence of taxes and municipal net wealth through the capitalization channel.
Correct foresight of future tax obligation because of low communal net funds translates to lower house prices today because of the housing market. Current bad management of local …nances is a problem of the current generation of house owners not the future one. To be even more precise, consider a community that does not care for the future generation. They decide that the jurisdiction indebts itself and redistributes all the money via a negative head tax to the current citizens for consumption. When all communal reserves are depleted and banks do not grant any more loans, they decide to move away and sell their property to some future inhabitants. All the accumulated liabilities do not represent a burden to the future generation. Property persits over time.
If the houses change hands through a free market, as has been realistically assumed, the low market price for homes will fully compensate the future inhabitants for the debts they have to repay. The bids of the buying generation is lower because of the higher tax schedule they have to face. The reduction in overlife income, or the burden, remains with the current generation, i.e., the generation that issued the municipal debts because they can only sell their property at a low value.
4 The Empirical Case dictions that is inherent in most capitalization studies according to Palmon and Smith (1998) .
Data and characteristics of Swiss communities
In 1982 the canton's municipalities introduced a harmonized public accounting system for budgeting and bookkeeping. These standards require each community to follow the same legal framework concerning their current and capital accounts. In addition, they demand an annual …nancial statement and a balance sheet. The harmonized public accounting system is based on a functional division, each representing local responsibilities. Communal properties and funds can either be of administrative or …nancial nature.
Public law applies to administrative assets which are usually used for the provision of local public goods and services. For the management of …nancial assets private law applies. Financial assets typically include shares, participation certi…cates and real estate holdings such as farms and forests, factories or commercial buildings. Swiss communes have full sovereignty from higher government levels in domains such as the acquisition, the use or the disposition of these assets. 20 The Swiss harmonized public accounting system is supposed to have rendered services beyond its original expectations.
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As opposed to municipalities in countries such as Germany and Austria, Swiss communities can become insolvent when they accumulate too high debts and obligations.
Most importantly, the Swiss federal court prevented higher government levels from bailing out insolvent communities in the publicly well know court case of the municipality 20 Municipalities associate local self-rule in asset management with autonomy which makes it almost a holy issue.
21 For a detailed discussion concerning communal real property management in Switzerland as well as the harmonized public accounting system see Da-on (2006) . Leukerbad: After Leukerbad became bankrupt with obligations mounting to 346 million Swiss francs (approximately 313 million US dollars) a number of creditors were issuing lawsuits against the canton to settle the community's obligations. The federal court rejected all of them, arguing that Swiss communities act on their own responsibility.
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Consequently, communities in our dataset do not have a strategic incentive to accumulate debts or budget de…cits because of the hope to be bailed out by higher government levels. An additional brake against debts and for a responsible asset management are local direct democratic institutions that allow citizens to actively participate in communal decisions as well as strong and independent communal auditing institutions (see
Eichenberger and Schelker 2007).
As a result, the metropolitan area of Zurich is a perfect laboratory in order to identify the impact of local assets and debts on private properties as implied by or theoretical model. Our dataset includes a large number of variables which capture real estate speci…c aspects, taxes, real net funds, public goods as well as di¤erent demographic characteristics.
We analyze the impact of municipal net funds on the following measures of housing services: the price of single family houses and the price of apartments. A comparable single family house for each municipality is characterized by …ve rooms, two wash rooms, 450 m2 surface, 750 m3 volume, end-terrace house, conveniently situated in the municipality, and one garage space. The price for apartments serves mainly for robustness tests and an apartment is characterized by …ve rooms, two wash rooms, 120 m2 usable space, in a house with four apartments, 15 m2 balcony, and one garage space. The dependent variables are therefore easily comparable between communities. Only di¤erent communal variables may explain price di¤erences. The housing data was obtained from the Cantonal Bank of Zurich. 
Zürich (Secretary for Education of the Canton of Zurich) and the GEFIS Finanzstatistik des Kantons Zürich (Financial Statistics of the Canton of Zurich). For our primary
variable of interest we use the real net funds which are the main municipal …nancial assets (liquidities, assets and equipment excluding accruals) minus debts (regular obligations, short-term debts and long-term debts excluding deferrals and provisions). For robustness tests we use four di¤erent measures reported by the Statistical O¢ ce: net funds (including accruals, deferrals and provisions), municipal equity from the balance sheets, auto-…nancing per capita which is a measure similar to the Cash Flow, and …-nally a theoretical indicator for debt repayment in years which are debts divided by tax revenue. Public goods are accounted for by the average class size in primary schools, an identi…cation whether the school is managed by the community itself or a separate school community, the fraction of elderly, the unemployment rate and the fraction of foreigners.
Furthermore, we use aggregate expenditures for culture, health and social well-being as an additional variable for public goods 24 and we have data on the communities'median incomes as well as their population densities. Needless to say, we take account of local real estate characteristics by including lake view, distance to the center, environmental damage and south-west exposition.
Our dataset contains these variables for all municipalities in the canton. The city of Zurich and Winterthur have a di¤erent structure and organization as the rest of the communities. They also form the centers of the canton itself: over 1998 to 2004
Zurich had an average of 337262 inhabitants and Winterthur an average of 89757. The other municipalities have on average approximately 5000 inhabitants. The two cities are composed of districts which are heterogeneous themselves. 25 For this reason and because we want to capture the e¤ect of distance to the canton's economic heart we do not include these observations in our further analysis.
26 24 Because of the special school structure with separate school communities we do not have a reliable measure for school expenditures and cannot directly inculde them. Anyhow, we control for class size and for school communities. 25 A consequence of this heterogeneity is the fact that unique variables for class sizes do not exist and where data are available, they are not disaggregated for the districts. 26 Including Zurich and Winterthur for robustness tests does not change the major conclusions concerning the equivalence of taxes and debts. The results are usually marginally signi…cant within the 10 to 15-%-level.
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All control variables, their sources, and a number of unweighted descriptive statistics are given in Table 1 . The variables are diverse and capture many di¤erent aspects of housing prices.
< Table 1 here >
Baseline results
The past empirical literature usually applied so called amenity models in order to estimate the impact of diverse variables on house prices (see for example Oates 1969 and the reactions to his paper, Stull and Stull 1991 or Brasington 2002 ). In these models the level of our measure of interest, municipal real net funds, is treated as one among several other attributes including the income tax rate, public goods and house location characteristics. 27 We use an amenity models of the following common speci…cation form
where it represents the value of the property in each jurisdiction i at time t. The coe…cients j for j = 2; :::; g measure the impact of public goods and the coe¢ cents j for j = g + 1; :::; a capture the e¤ect of other amenities auch as demographic and location e¤ects. This empirical speci…cation is closely linked to equation (12) of our theoretical model. 28 The estimated coe¢ cients of the municipals'real net funds and the tax rates represent each the ceteris paribus impact of a change in a community's wealth as well as its annual income tax rate. So called capitalization models would represent another empirical modeling choice which is convenient if the main variable of interest are property tax rates and the exact size of capitalization coe¢ cient matters. 28 As information on future public goods is inexistent we include current public goods. The panel structure captures the e¤ects of time. Therefore, we analyze the true relationship between real net funds and house values which the proposed amenity model. Table 2 shows the results for …ve speci…cations di¤ering in the number of included amenities and controls. An array of speci…cation tests are performed at the bottom of the table. Next to the signi…cant coe¢ cients of the ordinary least squares regressions we estimated the impact of a one percent increase in the mean of the respective independent variable on the dependent variable.
< Table 2 here > According to capitalization theory we expect the following signs for the independent variables: The coe¢ cient of the aggregate spending for culture, health and social security should be positive as expenditures are a crude measure for the provision of public goods.
Class size in primary schools is expected to be negative as it is an indicator for the quality of schooling. The impact on house prices of having the school included in the political community (indicator variable is one) or having a separate school community (indicator variable is zero) is unclear. Separate school communities might work more e¢ ciently (see Frey and Eichenberger 2002) . On the other hand additional bureaucratic overload might lead to problems. For lake view and south-west exposition we unanimously anticipate positive coe¢ cients whereas for the distance to the metropolitan center and the air pollution level negative coe¢ cients should be observed. As people over 65 usually need more health care and depend more on public transport as well as other services, we expect a higher fraction of elderly to be correlated positively with house prices controlling from median income which should itself be positively capitalized. Table 1 that the mean of this variable represents 2767 Swiss francs per capita. This indicates full capitalization of real net funds with a capitalization rate of 113.58 %. We perform a hypothesis test for full capitalization which tests whether the coe¢ cient of the variable real net funds is signi…cantly di¤erent from a the theoretical coe¢ cient value which would generate an impact of 27.67 Swiss francs. The p-value of the hypothesis test indicates that full capitalization cannot be rejected. 30 Our control variables for public goods have the expected sign though the e¤ect of class size on house 29 Because of complicated legal proceedings when buying a property, foreigners usually rent them. Positive or negative e¤ects of a high fraction of foreigners result from the fact that they are willing to pay high or low rents. 30 We shall discuss the problem of possible upward bias of the capitalization rates for real net funds in the next section. Full capitalization or even overcapitalization is not an uncommon phenomenon in the literature as contributions by Oates (1973) , Reinhard (1981) and Church (1974) show.
values is insigni…cant as is the e¤ect of the school community structure variable. We have not included year …xed e¤ects in the regression but estimated a pure pooling model. A Chow test for the poolability which compares the presented model with a within model including year speci…c e¤ects, does not result in a signi…cant test value.
31 Figure 1 has raised some statistical doubts concerning the linear relationship of our variable of interest with housing prices. We perform a Rainbow test in order to test for non-linearities. The basic idea of the Rainbow test is that if the true relationship is linear, a good …t can be achieved on a subsample using a certain fraction of the data. The null hypothesis is rejected whenever the overall …t is signi…cantly worse than the …t for the subsample.
Our test value does not allow us to reject the hypothesis of linearity using subsample data fractions of 0.25 and 0.75.
Although the econometric analysis of the data does not indicate that year …xed e¤ects have to be included in order to obtain consistent results, we control for their in ‡uence in all future speci…cations which corresponds to a conservative test of our hypotheses.
Speci…cation (2) includes the same controls as speci…cation (1) plus year speci…c e¤ects.
The results remain almost the same. The signs of the variables do not change and our measure of interest increases in its signi…cance to the 5-%-level. The impacts of real net funds and tax rates on housing prices increase in absolute values. Again full capitalization cannot be rejected and all speci…cation tests are also insigni…cant.
In speci…cation (3) we include an array of additional controls. As supposed the fraction of elderly has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on property values. Urban areas measured by population density have more expensive properties and …nally the e¤ect of a higher median income has a positive e¤ect too. All these additional controls are signi…cant. Their indirect e¤ect on the municipal real net funds is small. The coe¢ cient decreases but remains signi…cant at the 10-%-level. Its impact on house prices is still around 30 Swiss francs and full capitalization cannot be rejected either. The e¤ect of the inclusion of median income on income tax rates is high. The control variable decreases the income tax signi…cance level as well as its impact from over two thousend to 411.17
Swiss francs for a one percent change. Indeed, the correlation between median income and tax rates is negative and highly signi…cant (1-%-level). Consequently, the exclusion of median income biases the coe¢ cients of the income tax rate in regressions (1) and (2) negatively. The speci…cation tests do not react on the inclusion of the additional variables.
For speci…cation (4) we augment the number of explanatory variables from speci…-cation (3) by two additional controls for demographic characteristics. As expected the unemployment rate capitalizes negatively. For the fraction of foreigners, there is a positive capitalization e¤ect which is probably due to the large number of highly skilled
German and Austrian nationals working in Zurich. The variable for real net funds remains positive and signi…cant at the 10-%-level. Its impact is 32.91 Swiss francs and full capitalization is possible. The tax rate has approximately the same negative and signi…cant impact as in speci…cation (3).
Finally, we look at the capitalization e¤ect when the price of comparable apartments is the dependent variable. We still …nd a positive impact of real net funds on the variable but the e¤ect is only marginally signi…cant. The capitalization rate is 48.247 %. This might be due to the fact that the municipal wealth in ‡uences large land assets more directly than small ones. Indeed, it is really land that exists in…nitely and not the constructions on it. Apartments and ‡ats are also less persistent over time as houses in Switzerland were and are. Furthermore, it is the case that apartments change hands more frequently than houses and owners of apartments might therefore be less informed about municipal …nances as house and large property owners. All other variables do not change in their signs though their capitalization e¤ects are smaller. This is easily explained by the fact that apartment prices are lower than house values (see Table 1 ).
Overcapitalization of real net funds cannot be rejected which is mainly due to the high standard error. It seems though that the class size has a signi…cant and negative impact on apartment prices. The test statistics give no reason to question the linearity of our model.
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So far we have shown that municipal real net funds a¤ect property values positively which provides support for the capitalization mechanism of local public assets and debts leading to the equivalence of taxes and debts at the local level. We will analyze this relationship closer, by providing robustness tests, considering more indirect measures of municipal wealth and by bootstrapping the results.
Robustness tests and bootstrapping
Before presenting additional results in favor of the theoretical mechanism, we give a possible explanation for the high capitalization rates for municipal real net funds shown in Table 2 . The capitalization rates usually imply full capitalization or even overcapitalization. For regressions (3) and (4) Reinhard (1981) and Church (1974) report full or overcapitalization of property taxes, studies such as Edel and Sclar (1974) or the comprehensive study of Yinger, Bloom, Börsch-Supan, and Ladd (1988) show modest capitalization rates compared to other analyses. Using data on municipal utility districts in the northwest suburbs of Houston (Texas) where public goods provision is almost identical for each district but tax rates di¤er largely, Palmon and Smith (1998) show that capitalization rates are clearly above 60 % and full capitalization cannot be rejected.
Still, the capitalization rates for real net funds presented in this paper may be biased upwards. Although minimum standards for a number of local public goods are set by the cantonal or federal governments, municipalities di¤er in the provision levels to some extent. Suppose we cannot control perfectly for public services. True public services g true are measured as g true = g measured + g error . If higher municipal real net funds are used thoughtfully and are not simple wasted g true and real net funds will be positively correlated. The same holds for g error and municipal wealth. As we only control for public 26 services with g measured the coe¢ cient for real net funds is likely to be higher than its true value. Still, the main intention of this paper is to show the equivalence of taxes and local public de…cits or debts. The exact size of the capitalization rate is secondary.
We provide additional evidence for our case using di¤erent measures of municipal wealth and we perform a number of robustness tests which are given in Table 3 .
<Table 3 here>
Speci…cation (1) shows the results of a weighted least squares model which includes the same control variables as regression (4) of Table 2 . We use the log population as weights. The idea is that small communities might have systematically di¤erent real net funds because of better direct democratic control. Our results might consequently be driven by a subsample of the data. The coe¢ cient's size decreases when compared to regression (4) of Table 2 . However, weighting does not change the positive and signi…cant e¤ect of real net funds. There is no indication that our results for real net funds are an artifact of a number of small communities.
For speci…cations (2) to (6) we run 999 bootstrap estimations to obtain a clearer and unbiased view of the coe¢ cients. Indeed, the explicit recognition of uncertainty is central for our analysis. Using the procedure as described by Davison and Hinkley (1997) we derived the empirical bias of the OLS regressions and also calculate the bootstrapped standard deviations. Furthermore, we change the independent measure of communal wealth to provide additional support for the capitalization mechanism of municipal net funds.
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In column (2) the bootstrap still concerns the variable real net funds. The results for the coe¢ cients are for the given number of digits identical to those presented in Table 2 . The standard errors are smaller for the bootstrap estimates. Real net funds capitalize negatively and at the 5-%-level. The estimated bias of the independent variable of interest is -0.009 %. 33 We decided to analyze in robustness tests the speci…cation which uses the largest number of control variables for public goods and demographics in order to estimate the most stringent and conservative speci…cation. Decreasing the number of control variables leads to stronger results for the respective measure.
For speci…cation (3) we consider a new measure of a municipal's asset and debt situation. The Statistical O¢ ce of the Canton of Zurich reports a net funds measure which includes accruals, deferrals and provisions. This measure is widely used inside the o¢ ce itself and also for its reports on communal …nances. It is a rather volatile measure with a high standard deviation as especially accruals and deferrals tend to change from December 31st to January 1st, depending on bookkeeping practices. Therefore, net funds reported by the Statistical O¢ ce do not necessarily represent the assets a community really has and the actual obligations it faces in the future. As it is a widely applied and Municipal self-…nancing capacity is a hotly discussed topic in Switzerland. The Statistical O¢ ce reports a self-…nancing measure which is constructed using a number of di¤erent accounts linked to amortization, expenditures and revenues. The indicator represents approximately a managerial Cash Flow measure. Concerning the quality of this variable the same reservations apply as for the equity measure. Self-…nancing capacity capitalizes positively and at the 1-%-level as can be seen in speci…cation (5).
Finally, we use a hypothetical measure for the theoretical number of years it takes a municipality to fully pay back all its obligations. This measure takes all municipal debts and divides them by the total income tax revenue. The longer it (theoretically) takes a community to settle its obligation the more likely taxes rates will increase in the future.
We would therefore expect a negative sign of this debt repayment indicator.
34 Indeed, its in ‡uence is negative and highly signi…cant with a -0.409 % bias.
We note that, broadly, all other control variables, except the income tax rate in speci…cation (2), do not change in their signi…cance level when compared to regression (4) of Table 2 which includes the largest array of controls. Usually even the size of the coe¢ cients indicates only minor changes in the capitalization pattern. The explanatory value of all our regressions is above 84 %.
Conclusion
The forward-looking individual understands that a government's borrowing today means higher taxes in the future. In Barro (1974) 's model the current generation's utility function includes the utility of the next generation which includes the utility of the next generation and so forth. Individuals increase their savings as a reaction to higher budget de…cits in order to enable the future generation to pay back the debts. The so called Ricardian equivalence of taxes and public debts applies to the national level. The burden of the national debt can consequently not be shifted between generations. At the local level with mobile individuals another mechanism is likely to be more compelling: debt capitalization in property values.
We have argued that even non-altruistic individuals are not able to accumulate debts at the expense of the future generations. In our theoretical model landed property persist over time. The value of houses depends on current and future taxes and public services 34 Leeds (1985) uses a similar measure when analyzing underfunding problems of local pensions in the Chicago area.
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as well as on a number of location speci…c amenities. Individuals bid high prices for houses in communities with low taxes and high quality public goods. They know that low municipal net funds because of depleted communal reserves, budget de…cits or debts lead to higher taxes in the future as debts have to be repaid and reserves have to be replenished. If a generation had the idea to (non-altruistically) accumulate debts in order to put a burden on the future generation, their brainchild back…res. The value of the debt issuing generation's houses decrease by exactly the same amount as the discounted value of taxes the future generation has to pay to settle the old obligations. The buying generation simply decreases its bids for properties in indebted communities.
Using a panel dataset for municipalities in the Swiss metropolitan of Zurich, we can test our theoretical predictions. Switzerland is an ideal laboratory for this test. The Swiss federal court has ruled out the possibility of a municipal bail out by higher government levels in the well publicized case of the community of Leukerbad. Moreover, Swiss municipalities have the possibility to levy income taxes via a municipal collection rate. Communal property management is a sacred issue as communities link it with sovereignty. Finally, all municipalities in the canton of Zurich use a modern and comparable, harmonized accounting system.
Our empirical results con…rm the theoretical predictions. Municipalities with high real net funds have also higher house prices. The e¤ect is stable even when considering a large array of independent controls. In robustness tests we show that a number of other measures for a communities asset/debt situation capitalize positively too, making a strong argument for the equivalence of taxes and debts at the local level. The mechanism generating the equivalence seems to work via capitalization of …scal di¤erences in municipal real net funds.
As long as capital and housing markets function and individuals act rationally, in the sense that they are not blinded by …scal illusion as far as expected taxes and public goods are concerned, the burden of local budged de…cits and debts cannot be shifted to the future. Local debts merely reschedule explicit tax payments but the burden of the debt remains with the generation issuing the obligations. On the local level the Abba P.
Lerner quote "We owe it to ourselves."seems more compelling then ever but its meaning has changed. 6 Appendix 6.1 Finding Equation (5) Suppliers maximize pro…ts for given bids. Their problem is therefore max H C(cH):
The …rst order condition is given by
rearranging the terms and using (1) as demand must equal supply, yields the result.
Finding Equation (9)
The e¤ect an increase in taxes for given g t and a on the bid price can be established as follows: Rewrite (6) for all t as t = y t H(1 + r) t and integrate over t . The solution is ( 1 ; :::; t 1 ; t ; t+1 ; :::; n ; G; a)
for all t = 0; 1; :::; n. ( P gt (1+r) t ) + ( a) are constants of integration as public services and amenities are held constant. Discounting the result is necessary in order to obtain the price bid for the …rst period. The result is
6.3 Finding Equation (10) In a similar manner as above we can …nd the e¤ect of an increase in g t . The partial derivate of the Lagragian for H is 2 1 H (G; ; a) = 0:
Solving for and using this result in (7) yields
Integrating, applying the exponential function and rearranging the terms gives us ( ; g 1 ; ::: g t 1 ; g t ; g t+1 ; :::; g n ; a) = g 3 = 2 t for all t = 0; 1; :::; n.
is an integration speci…c constant. Discounting the result is necessary in order to obtain the price bid for the …rst period. The …nal result is
6.4 Finding Equation (11) As when deriving (10) we need to solve for …rst and use it in (8) leading to (169) 1183 (169) 1183 (169) 1183 (169) 1183 ( Source: own calculations * The impact of a one percent increase of the mean of the respective independent variable on property prices. The left-hand-side variable in OLS regressions (1) to (4) is the log price of a standardized and comparable single family house across 169 municipalities for the years 1998 to 2004. The OLS regression (5) uses the log price of a standardized and comparable apartment as dependent variable. Robust standard errors using a White heteroskedasticity adjusted sandwich estimator are given in parenthesis. The full capitalization test indicates whether the coefficient for the variable RealNetFunds is significantly from the value that generates an impact of 27.67 Swiss francs (exact coefficient value is 1.258e-06). The Pooltests compares a pooling model without year specific effects with a within model including year specific effects. The Rainbow test is concerned with the linearity of the true relationship. Linearity cannot be rejected.
a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %.
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